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Abstract—Let’s Encrypt is a new entrant in the Certificate
Authority ecosystem that offers free and automated certificate
signing. It is visionary in its commitment to Certificate Trans-
parency. In this paper, we shed light on the adoption patterns
of Let’s Encrypt “in the wild” and inform the future design
and deployment of this exciting development in the security
landscape. We analyze acquisition patterns of certificates as
well as their usage and deployment trends in the real world.
To this end, we analyze data from Certificate Transparency
Logs containing records of more then 18 million certificates. We
also leverage other sources like Censys, Alexa’s historic records,
Geolocation databases, and VirusTotal. We also perform active
HTTPS measurements on the domains owning Let’s Encrypt
certificates. Our analysis of certificate acquisition shows that (1)
the impact of Let’s Encrypt is particularly visible in Western
Europe; (2) Let’s Encrypt has the potential to democratize
HTTPS adoption in countries that are recent entrants to Internet
adoption; (3) there is anecdotal evidence of popular domains
quitting their previously untrustworthy or expensive CAs in
order to transition to Let’s Encrypt; and (4) there is a “heavy
tailed” behavior where a small number of domains acquire a
large number of certificates. With respect to usage, we find
that: (1) only 54% of domains actually use the Let’s Encrypt
certificates they have procured; (2) there are many non-trivial
incidents of server misconfigurations; and (3) there is early
evidence of use of Let’s Encrypt certificates for typosquatting and
for malware-laden sites. Based on these results, we derive key
security implications and recommendations for Let’s Encrypt,
website administrators, browser vendors, and end users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s web ecosystem critically relies on Certificate Au-
thorities (CAs) in order to ensure that network connections are
trusted and secure, as they vouch for the binding between a do-
main name and its public key by issuing digital cryptographic
certificates. While CAs are a key part of this ecosystem, there
are several known problems with them. First, the issuance of
SSL/TLS certificates by traditional Certificate Authorities has
historically been a manual and expensive process, with costs
(per certificate) somewhere between $5 and $1000 a year [10],
[29]. Second, Certificate Authorities have had little to no
incentive for transparency so they rarely publish complete lists
of the certificates they have signed; instead they serve as the
sole entity to evaluate certificate requests. This has serious
security ramifications in the event a compromised or malicious
CAs issues fraudulent and untracked certificates. This threat is
not hypothetical and has precedent: DigiNotar mis-issued SSL
certificates that were later used to perform man-in-the-middle
attacks against web users [13].
Certificate Transparency is a new effort that promises to
combat the danger of compromised or malicious CAs issuing
rogue certificates by adding all newly issued or revoked
certificates to a public, verifiable, append-only log [43]. This
ensures that if a certificate is not in the log, the client can take
appropriate action and refuse to connect to a particular web-
site. If certificates are in the log, the community can quickly
determine if they are dangerous or fraudulent and act to
revoke them. The development of Certificate Transparency has
contributed to the emergence of (i) protocols that automatically
sign minimally-validated certificates such as the Automated
Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [3] and (ii)
Certificate Authorities that utilize these protocols to automate
the procedure of issuing certificates, like Let’s Encrypt [20].
Let’s Encrypt is currently the primary Certificate Authority
leveraging the ACME protocol. Let’s Encrypt appears to be
particularly popular as it is currently signing certificates at a
rate of about 55,000 a day. A particularly interesting feature
of Let’s Encrypt is that it is both free and automated.
Motivating Questions: The goal of this paper is to shed
light on the adoption patterns of Let’s Encrypt certificates
“in the wild”. Such an understanding can be immensely
useful to multiple players in the end-to-end HTTPS ecosystem.
For instance, this can shed light on: (1) how and where
HTTPS adoption can be further stimulated; (2) expose po-
tential sources of design optimizations and considerations for
future deployments (e.g., are there flash crowds or heavy tailed
behaviors); and (3) understand if/how the free and automated
deployment can lead to potential sources of misconfigurations
or abuse.
We divide our analysis into two high-level categories: (1)
acquisition of certificates and (2) usage in the wild.
1) Acquisition: With respect to acqusition, we seek to
analyze several natural questions with respect to:
• Geographic characteristics of issued certificates:
Is Let’s Encrypt popular in countries with already
high web/HTTPS penetration or is it more popular
in countries with emerging Internet adoption?
• The ‘profile’ and motives of web domains that
obtain them:
Is adoption uniformly popular across different users
or are some acquiring more certificates than others?
Were sites previously using HTTPS with other CAs
and then switching to Let’s Encrypt? How many of
the certificates are first time HTTPS deployments?
Are the early adopters popular websites or in the
“tail” of the popularity distribution?
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2) Usage: With respect to usage patterns in the wild, there
are several natural questions regarding:
• Actve deployment:
Are users requesting Let’s Encrypt certificates
merely out of curiosity or are they being deployed
in “production”? Are users using these certificates
and renewal processes correctly?
• Malicious Intents:
Does the free and automatic character of issuing
trusted certificates become an enabler for malicious
activites such as typosquatting and for delivering
malware?
Methodology and Findings: Using a dataset of around 18
million certificate logs as well as Alexa’s records of the top
1 million web domains and services like Censys, VirusTotal
and Geolocation databases we set out to answer questions
on adoption and usage. We use the Certificate Transparency
Logs in order to identify the domains certified by Let’s
Encrypt and then we collect amplifying information from the
aforementioned services.
Using this data, we perform our measurement experiments
and our key findings are as follows:
• Geographical distribution of certificates: Let’s En-
crypt has notably contributed to the democratization of
adoption of TLS certificates. In countries like Argentina,
Ukraine and South Africa, Let’s Encrypt certificates are
over-represented in the whole population of HTTPS web-
sites by a factor of 5. In western Europe, countries like
Switzerland, France and the Netherlands issue the most
certificates as a function of their active Internet population
with an average ratio of 3.9 certificates per thousand
active Internet users.
• Characteristics of adopting websites: We investigate
the characteristics of websites that have adopted Let’s
Encrypt as their CA. We observe that 1.2% of popular
websites appearing in Alexa top million have transitioned
from paid CAs to Let’s Encrypt.
• Bulk acquisition of certificates: We estimate that around
7% of all issued Let’s Encrypt certificates are used
by companies for services that provide web-interfaces
for secure communication between end-users and the
company’s products (e.g. routers, Network Attached Stor-
age Devices or dynamic DNS servers). We identify and
discuss implications of this practice.
• Usage characteristics: The free nature of Let’s Encrypt
has inadvertently created a pool of users that are inter-
ested in using the platform only out of curiosity. We
estimated that the number of domains for which multiple
redundant certificates have been issued is on average 9%
of the number of domains using Let’s Encrypt. Further,
we found that 15% of the total number of Let’s Encrypt
domains opt out by not renewing their certificates. Fi-
nally, we observe that of the active domains that obtained
a Let’s Encrypt certificate, only 50% replied with a valid
Let’s Encrypt certificate on the standard HTTPS port.
• Malicious usage: We see anecdotal cases where users
have tried to provide legitimacy to malicious websites
by ‘securing’ them with certificates provided by Let’s
Encrypt. We experiment with typosquatted domains and
discover that indeed malicious users have tried to leverage
free TLS certificates to exploit users’ trust.
Implications: Based on the findings, we derive some key
implications and recommendations for Let’s Encrypt, domain
owners, users, and for browser vendors:
1) For Let’s Encrypt: First, the adoption patterns of Let’s
Encrypt suggest that there is a number of domains
requesting a large number of certificates for subdomains.
This could both increase the load for renewals on Let’s
Encrypt and needlessly bloat the audit logs. Therefore,
Let’s Encrypt should maybe revisit the decision to not
support wildcard certificates (e.g., *foo.com), for cases
where they would be a secure option (and provide guid-
ance to domain owners on when wildcard certificates are
not a suitable option). Second, the early signs of free
certificates being used for malicious intent suggest that
Let’s Encrypt can run checks for malicious indicators or
for typosquatting intent as a proactive measure before
issuing certificates.
2) For domain owners: Domain owners could benefit from
some simple sanity checks to avoid common misconfig-
uration errors as we observed above. We also suggest
that domain owners refrain from requesting certificates
for inactive domains to avoid bloating up the audit logs.
Finally, domain owners could benefit the community by
providing more metadata and being more forthcoming
in giving reasons or their intents while requesting cer-
tificates; e.g., why domains are inactive or why they
transitioned.
3) For users and browser vendors: Given that there are a
few common misconfiguration templates (e.g., default
“toy” server configuration), users and browsers could
proactively check for these when accessing HTTPS-
enabled sites and potentially report them to a central
“certificate health” repository.
Roadmap: Section 2 provides some background on Cer-
tificate Transparency, Let’s Encrypt and related measurement
studies. Section 3 discusses the dataset and methodology used
in our measurements. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the results
of the adoption and usage patterns respectively. Section 6
presents implications of our analysis and finally Section 7
concludes this work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we first provide background on Certificate
Transparency and the mechanisms of Let’s Encrypt. Then,
we discuss previous works that have provided preliminary
measurements and insights on the adoption of Let’s Encrypt
A. Certificate Transparency
The core idea behind Certificate Transparency is to create
a public, verifiable, append-only certificate log. The log’s
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integrity can be trusted because all of its entries are cryp-
tographically verifiable. By checking the log, any client can
verify the validity of a certificate before connecting to a
particular website. If the certificate is not logged, then the
client can reject the connection and avoid mistrusting the
provided certificate. Appending certificates to the log does not
add any extra latency as log-inclusion proofs are incorporated
to the TLS handshake [43].
To avoid Certificate Transparency logs being wasteful in
storage and bandwidth, current approaches leverage Merkle
Trees. These are efficient data structures in which a leaf
is an item in the log and each branch is a cryptographic
hash of the nodes below the branch. The root of the tree,
assembled by successive hashing, is therefore a summary of
all it’s contents. A site may provide the signed root node
of the transparancy log’s Merkle Tree to prove that it has
not changed the log or misbehaved [43]. This allows for
trusted and efficient log-inclusion proofs. The proliferation of
an HTTPS ecosystem in which Certificate Transparency is an
integral component makes scalability considerations important
factors in the design of logs. As the web scales, they need
to keep vast amounts of data and also to synchronize them
between different replicas worldwide.
B. Let’s Encrypt
The principal goal of Let’s Encrypt [20] and the ACME
protocol [3], [2] is to make security accessible for everyone.
The strategy for doing so is a service for websites to obtain
a browser-trusted certificate without any human intervention
by the Certificate Authority and minimal effort from the
server’s administrator. This happens by running a certificate
management agent on the web server. The procedure happens
in two steps. First, the agent proves to the CA that the web
server controls a domain and then the agent can request, renew,
and revoke certificates for that domain.
Let’s Encrypt uses public key cryptography to identify the
server. During the first communication between the server and
Let’s Encrypt, a new public-private key pair is generated. This
is similar to the process of creating an account at a traditional
CA. The server administrator queries Let’s Encrypt in order to
find out how the user should prove they own the domain. The
CA then issues one or more challenges. The current options
are; (1) check DNS records for the domain or (2) access a
token on a specific URI on that domain. Additionally, Let’s
Encrypt issues a nonce that the agent running on the web-
server needs to sign with their newly-issued private key [20].
Once the challenges have been satisfied, the domain has been
validated, and the key pairs are authorized. The user can
now issue requests for new certificates as well as renew or
revoke existing certificates. They must simply send certificate
management messages signed with the authorized key pair.
One interesting point about certificate issuance is choosing
the log that will keep a record of the certificate. While
Let’s Encrypt claims to submit all its certificates to Certifi-
cate Transparency Logs, there is no stated official log that
they submit to [21]. Information about published certificates
can be found on domains specializing in certificate searches
like https://crt.sh.
C. Related work
Early measurements of Let’s Encrypt: A parallel effort
to quantify the impact of Let’s Encrypt has been performed
by J.C. Jones, a Security Engineer at Mozilla who designed
the infrastructure for Let’s Encrypt and currently serves on
its Technical Advisory Board [1], [14]. This work utilized
Certificate Transparency Logs as the primary lens to gain
insight into the adoption and utilization of Let’s Encrypt as
a Certificate Authority. It investigated the number of domains
using Let’s Encrypt certificates that did not previously have
a TLS certificate. Moreover, Jones addressed the utility of
Certificate Transparency Logs as a data source by also exam-
ining the number of certificates that can be found in scans
by Censys [37] but not in Certificate Transparency Logs.
Using this data, the post observes how Let’s Encrypt compares
with other established Certificate Authorities, such as Comodo,
Symantec or GoDaddy.
This concurrent work determined that 90.4% of the do-
mains using Let’s Encrypt are new to Web PKI and Let’s
Encrypt ranks fourth in the list of most observed unexpired
certificates grouped by issuer. Also, it presented data showing
that 55% of issued Let’s Encrypt Certificates are only found
in Certificate Transparency Logs, 35% can be found in both
Transparency Logs and Censys and 9% can only be found
in Censys thus validating the largely comprehensive nature of
Certificate Transparency Logs. Interestingly, the presence of
sites with Let’s Encrypt certificates not listed in transparancy
logs seems counter to the goal that all Let’s Encrypt certificates
are submitted to logs. Remedying this disconnect will be an
important issue going forward.
While this parallel effort tackled high level questions con-
cerning the scale of Let’s Encrypt’s operations, and demon-
strated how a commitment to Certificate Transparency makes
these logs an invaluable lens into an otherwise opaque ecosys-
tem, it did not attempt to link certificate issuance to actual
usage. We observe that the unprecedented low barriers to entry
in the automated and free nature of Let’s Encrypt causes this
simplifying assumption to not hold. It is invalid to assume
that just because a certificate was issued that it is actively,
or correctly, securing a domain. In this work we start from
the same foundation of Certificate Transparency Logs but
go further by leveraging other sources such as Geolocation
databases, Alexa’s historical records, VirusTotal, and active
HTTPS scans to shed light on specifically measurable aspects
of the adoption and utilization of Let’s Encrypt.
Related measurement efforts: Our work follows in the line
of a rich history of measurements of security-related aspects
of the web ecosystem. There are several orthogonal efforts
analyzing other aspects of the HTTPS ecosystem. Liu et al.,
study the frequency and accuracy of certificate revocation
and checking; they paint a less-than-optimistic picture of the
effectiveness of revocation [45]. Durumeric et al., analyze
the prevalence of the Heartbleed vulnerability in web servers
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and assess the impact on the web certificate ecosystem [39].
Zhang et al, more specifically look at the issue of revocation
behavior in the aftermath of Heartbleed [50]. Bates et al.,
analyze the adoption of the Convergence CA extension to
the “crowdsourced” approach for certificate verification named
Perspective [49]; they measure how effective it will be at
scale and suggest that simple caching strategies can improve
scalability [34]. Naylor et al, have analyzed the costs of
websites moving to HTTPs [46] and Varvello et al, analyze the
adoption of the HTTP/2 standard [48]. In terms of measure-
ment infrastructures, Zmap [38] and Censys [37] provide novel
capabilities for Internet-scale scanning and provide useful
datasets that enable the kinds of analysis we perform in this
paper. A recent work by Lever et al., looks at the notion
of residual trust when domain registrations expire and are
repurposed with a different use [44]. We observe that a small
but non-trivial fraction of certificates were not renewed. Given
the automated nature of certificate renewals, an interesting
direction for future analysis is measuring scenarios if these
certificate renewals failed because domain registrations lapsed.
Other related work in web certificates: Let’s Encrypt
leverages new ideas like Certificate Transparency and the
ACME protocol. It promises to revolutionize the tedious,
human-in-the-loop procedure of issuing trusted certificates. It
is the first organization to automate such a procedure, yet
will likely not be the last. The following subsection focuses
on recent articles that showcase the early impacts of Let’s
Encrypt [14]. For the interested reader, related research in the
broader area of certificates and web-trust includes but is not
limited to works that: evaluate the Certificate Trust Model [36],
discuss efficient ‘gossip’ protocols to ensure consistency of
certificate logs [35], develop methods for enhanced certificate
transparency and end-to-end encrypted mail [47], and discuss
common SSL errors or cases of forged certificates [33], [41].
III. DATASET AND METHODOLOGY
In this section we describe our datasets, the methodology
by which we collected and processed them, as well as the
limitations of our approach. Our decisions were guided by
our overarching goal which is to evaluate the adoption and
usage patterns of Let’s Encrypt certificates. Specifically, our
methodology should allow us to investigate the rate of adop-
tion of Let’s Encrypt certificates, the motives of adopting users,
their geographic distribution as well as the HTTPS history of
Let’s Encrypt-certified domains. We also needed be able to
identify patterns of misuse or abuse on behalf of users as well
as indications for malicious activities.
A. Sources of Data
Our first goal was to collect a complete list of domains
that have used Let’s Encrypt as their Certificate Authority.
The source of these domains was Certificate Transparency
logs, which collectivelly contain a complete record of virtually
all the signed certificates issued by Certificate Authorities
complying with Certificate Transparency rules, including Let’s
Encrypt. We evaluated two primary options for obtaining
certificate transparency logs; a full log mirror solution and
a simpler log downloader. As a major supporter of Certificate
Transparency, Google provides an open source log server
solution that can also be used in mirror mode [18]. We
first examined this option as it would be the most full-
featured solution. However, community members have built
more streamlined tools for batch downloads, leading us to a
second method, a simple log downloader. We utilized the code
provided by James ‘J.C.’ Jones [11] as well as the original ct-
sync tool from Adam Langley as described in his efforts to
establish Certificate Transparency [6].
Using this method we downloaded the full set of Certificate
Transparency Logs from the Certly Log Server [7] which
includes certificates issued by Let’s Encrypt up to March 31st.
In this batch, we obtained certificate logs for 1,331,781 unique
certificates to analyze. This includes 1,156,266 certificates
issued by Let’s Encrypt. This full mirror was the first dataset
which we used for analysis and further amplification. On
April 15th 2016, Google announced that Certly failed to
comply with Certificate Transparency regulations, specifically
the requirement about 99% uptime [12] and therefore was no
longer considered as a trusted CT log by the community. We
proceeded by scaling our measurements up by downloading
Google’s most recent Aviator CT log of around 17 million en-
tries. As mentioned in Section II there is no offical Certificate
Transparency log for Let’s Encrypt certificates. A comparison
between the official announcements from the Let’s Encrypt
organization [22] about issued certificates with the number
of Let’s Encrypt certificates appearing in Certly showed that
Certly contained 90% of the issued certificates up until March
30th and therefore at the time we evaluated that this would be
an adequate preliminary data set. After Certly was no longer
considered a trusted Transparency log, the Aviator log was
determined to be a satisfactory replacement.
The information stored in Certificate Transparency logs was
the starting point for most of our experiments. This allowed us
to bootstrap our measurements related with the geographical
characteristics of Let’s Encrypt, typosquatting analyses and
also enabled the collection of auxiliary information from
services like VirusTotal [31] and Alexa [4]. The validity period
of each certificate allowed us to investigate certificate usage
patterns and user behavior, including determining the existence
of duplicate certificates for a particular domain. A caveat of
this method, however, is that since many traditional Certificate
Authorities do not make their certificate records public, the
knowledge about HTTPS history of domains would have to
come from other sources.
To collect additional information about each domain found
in the Certificate Transparency logs, we had to leverage
other services that could provide us with useful amplifying
information and metadata. This information came from the
following datasets and allowed us to gain clearer insights into
the Let’s Encrypt ecosystem.
1. VirusTotal [31]: an online service which can be used to scan
a URL, domain name, IP or a file against various ‘malicious
activity detection’ services. Specifically, VirusTotal scans each
4
         0
    500000
   1000000
   1500000
   2000000
   2500000
   3000000
   3500000
   4000000
2015-11-1
7
2016-01-0
6
2016-02-2
5
2016-04-1
4
Is
su
ed
 C
er
tifi
ca
te
s
Date
Fig. 1: Overall acquisition patterns of LE certificates
URL with 67 different antivirus solutions and reports how many
reported that a domain is suspicious or infected.
2. Censys [5]: provides internet-wide scan data capturing how
devices, websites, and certificates are configured and deployed.
It contains a collection of historic data for most domains of
interest and provides a SQL like interface for users to make
queries to these sources of data.
3. Alexa [4]: a service that provides commercial web traffic
data and analytics in order to benchmark and compare web
domains.
4. Geolite2 Geolocation Database [17]: This service allowed
us to get geographic information about domains of interest.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CERTIFICATE ACQUISITION
In this section we present results pertaining to the acquisi-
tion patterns of Let’s Encrypt certificates. First, we evaluate
the rate of acquisition of Let’s Encrypt and then we proceed
by characterizing the geographic distribution of certificates.
We then explore the prevalence of certificates among popular
websites and finally, we investigate the ‘profiles’ and motives
of adopting users, especially those who obtain certificates in
large quantities.
A. Rate of Adoption
To analyze the acquisition of Let’s Encrypt as a Certificate
Authority, we downloaded Certificate Transparency logs from
17 September 2015 up to 15 May 2016. Figure 1 confirms the
popular perception that adoption is on the rise and shows the
total number of certificates issued by Let’s Encrypt over time.
We can clearly see that acquisition is on the rise with close to
4M certificates issued as of May 14, 2016.
We also analyzed if there were interesting temporal patterns
in the issuance of these certificates. To this end, we looked at
the number of certificates issued per day as well as the number
of unique effective TLDs (e.g., xyz.com or foo.co.uk
rather than .com or .co.uk) that acquired certificates on a
daily basis in Figure 2. Figure 2a shows the aggregate number
of issued certificates per day, while Figure 2b shows the unique
effective TLDs (eTLDs) requesting Let’s Encrypt certificates
on a daily basis. This result is generally consistent with our
general acquisition graph but it also reveals an interesting
observation that there are certain abnormal peaks in early May.
We further investigated the root causes of these spikes and
found two types of explanations. The first observation was
that a set of providers were issuing certificates for many of
the subdomains they controlled. That is either because Let’s
Encrypt does not support wildcards; e.g., xyz.com requests
certificates for a.xyz.com and b.xyz.com or because each
subdomain represents a different user account requiring its
own dedicated certificate. These providers generally obtain
a very large number of certificates at once. An example of
one such user is automattic.com, a web development
company that between May 4th and May 7th 2016 issued 850
certificate for its clients. Table I depicts Let’s Encrypt users
that issued the highest number of certificates for the peaks
of figure 2a. Interestingly, the same user is responsible for
acquiring certificates in bulk on a regular basis.
Date eTLD Issued certificates
May 4th freeboxos 5419
May 5th freeboxos 2159
May 6th freeboxos 1652
May 7th freeboxos 1426
May 10th freeboxos 1199
TABLE I: eTLD with most certificates issued
However, that does not tell the full story and cannot fully
explain the spikes. In fact, if we look closely at Figures 2a
and 2b, what we actually see is that the number of unique
domains issuing certificates is comparable to the numbers of
certificates issued per day. Using DNS resolution and whois
lookups on the set of domains that were issued certificates
on these specific days revealed that many of them in fact
had the same authoritative name server or the same NS entry
in the WHOIS record. A specific example was a French
provider ovh.com that seemed to have obtained certificates
for many unique eTLDs that do not share a common suffix;
i.e., these were domains of the form xyz.com rather than
xyz.ovh.com. In particular, during the days with the highest
spikes on adoption, we observed that OVH was responsible for
30-35% of the total number of certificates issued and that up
to the end of our measurement period, it had acquired around
650,000 Let’s Encrypt certificates.
B. Analysis of Top Users
The insight that particular users consistently acquire
large numbers of certificates led us to proceed with our
investigation of the websites using Let’s Encrypt clus-
tered by the effective TLD (eTLD). For example, do-
mains a.example.com and b.example.com were clus-
tered under example.com. Similarly, domains such as
a.example.co.uk and b.example.co.uk were clus-
tered under example.co.uk. The goal was to pinpoint
cases of domains with a surprisingly high number of issued
certificates. We excluded cases of domains where the Second
Level Domain represents a geographic location (for example
domains in Ukraine are clustered at a city level so a domain in
Kiev will end in kiev.ua), as we wanted to identify unique
entities obtaining Let’s Encrypt certificates in bulk.
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Fig. 2: Per-day analysis of certificates and unique Domains
requesting certificates
SLD % Issued Certificates
freeboxos 155, 071
synology 6109
cdn77 5928
hoffman-andrews 3114
duckdns 2820
dyndns 1653
TABLE II: Second Level Domains with most Let’s Encrypt
certificates
Table II contains the 6 highest e-TLDs and the number
of certificates issued. For the specific entries in Table II,
what we observe anecdotally is that companies often obtain
large numbers of Let’s Encrypt certificates in order to provide
secure connections between the end-user and the web inter-
faces of services they sell. For example, ‘FreeboxOS’ is a
service offered by the popular low-cost French ISP ‘Free’ that
combines telephony, satellite TV and WiFi [16]. FreeboxOS
provides a web interface so that users can connect to their local
modem and safely manage their account, therefore they issue
a TLS certificate per userID. Similar patterns are observed
by other companies in the table above like ‘duckDNS’ and
‘Synology’. (The one exception is Jacob Hoffman-Andrews
who is a programmer, tech blogger and contributor to Let’s
Encrypt which explains the high number of Let’s Encrypt
certificates issued for his personal website.)
The certificates acquired by the domains in Table II account
for almost 7% of the total number of certificates issued by
Let’s Encrypt. Their purpose is to provide secure access to
individual client-owned devices (e.g freeboxos cable boxes), as
well as to user profiles managed by the certificate-acquiring or-
ganizations. The service for which these certificates are issued
requires individual, per-user certificates, rather than wildcard
certificates (*.domain.com) which would make users suscep-
tible to Man-In-The-Middle attacks. However, the observation
that companies request very high numbers of certificates also
draws attention to the fact that Let’s Encrypt does not currently
support wildcard certificates.
Supporting wildcard certificates is, in our opinion, a feature
that would be useful for specific applications. For example,
libraries around the world use a product called EZproxy
to connect library patrons to licensed resources. In order
for the connection between the patron and EZproxy to be
encrypted, EZproxy requires the use of a large number of
nonstandard ports or wildcard certs [23]. We also believe that
the absence of wildcard certificates can potentially lead to 2
major scalability issues in the Certificate Transparency logs.
First, it can create an excessive storage overhead and also
as Certificate Transparency Logs are often distributed and
replicated around the world, the lack of wildcard certificates
can harm the performance of log synchronization when new
certificates are added.
C. Geographical Analysis
In order to answer the question of whether Let’s Encrypt
has facilitated the democratization of TLS, we characterize
the geographic distribution of Let’s Encrypt certificates. We
focused on two key questions: (i) finding the countries where
certificates issued by Let’s Encrypt are most popular and (ii)
finding those countries in which Let’s Encrypt certificates
have been disproportionately popular compared to the overall
number of websites (HTTPS enabled or not).
Analysis approach: To determine and visualize the geograph-
ical distribution of encrypted certificates we use the following
steps:
1) Collect Let’s Encrypt domain names.
2) Resolve the domain names into valid IP addresses.
3) Determine Autonomous Systems for each of the de-
mands, in order to identify when many websites might
be using the same cloud hosting providers.
4) Look up each IP address and a geolocation database to
get the latitude, longitude, city, state and country.
5) Cluster data by country and visualize using a Choropleth
map [8].
As an aside, we observed that the process for resolving
around 2 million domain names into IP addresses pushes the
limits of Domain name resolution as DNS for end-users is a
relatively slow process that suffers in reliability when querying
at high speeds. To address this problem, we created a DNS
query script written in Go-lang that manually crafted DNS
packets to hardcoded domain name servers. Since each domain
name server put query rate limiters on the program, the system
had to be designed to request DNS resolutions from many
DNS servers at a time, including multiple DNS resolvers from
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Amazon Web Services and Google. Ultimately, the system was
able to achieve over 500 DNS resolutions per second. This
enabled us to resolve 2 million domain names in one hour on
a well-connected server.
The method described above showed that 29,372 domains
or 1.5% of the domains queried did not resolve to any IP
addresses because the servers had been taken down or are not
publicly accessible. We consider 1.5% of the total number
of domains to be a small fraction that does not skew the
results of the geographic distribution and exclude these from
the analysis. However, of the websites that did not resolve,
it was interesting to see how many of them had issued more
than one Let’s Encrypt certificate. We found that 20% of these
domains had more than one Let’s Encrypt certificate.
Fig. 3: Raw Count of Let’s Encrypt certificates
Results: As Figure 3 shows, Let’s Encrypt certificates are
most commonly used in countries with high Internet penetra-
tion. This is a seemingly obvious result but we delved deeper
in order to find out in which countries Let’s Encrypt certificates
are most popular. We compared the number of active Let’s
Encrypt certificates with the active Internet population of
each country [19]. The results can be seen in Table III.
Table IV shows the 20 countries with the highest number of
issued certificates as a percentage of the total number of Let’s
Encrypt certificates. We observe that Let’s Encrypt certificate
penetration is predominant in Central and Western Europe
and for countries like Switzerland, the Netherlands, France
or Germany the percentage of active usage and acquisition is
4 times higher compared to the United States. The ratio is
8 times for Canada. We postulate that this fact is because
a large number of Western European countries have solid
awareness about the importance of privacy on the Internet.
Is a longstanding priority for the citizens of these countries
and those considering hosting personal or business sites seek
out getting certificates from authorities like Let’s Encrypt.
Country certificates/1000 users
Switzerland 5.0
France 3.887
Netherlands 3.703
Germany 3.061
Singapore 2.941
Ireland 2.338
Czech Republic 1.633
Ukraine 1.622
Iceland 1.489
Luxemburg 1.445
Estonia 1.172
USA 1.094
Austria 0.881
Sweden 0.828
Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.699
Denmark 0.635
Norway 0.535
Canada 0.525
Slovenia 0.523
Latvia 0.523
TABLE III: Top 20 countries with highest number of Let’s
Encrypt certificates as a function of the active Internet
population
Country % certificates/all LE certs
United States 28.14%
Germany 19.48%
France 19.41%
Netherlands 5.3%
United Kingdom 4.3%
Switzerland 3.27%
Ukraine 2.86%
Slovak Republic 2.22%
Canada 1.51%
Japan 1.39%
Czech Republic 1.36%
Singapore 1.24 %
Russia 1.14%
Ireland 0.78%
Sweden 0.6%
Australia 0.63%
Poland 0.58%
Austria 0.55%
Spain 0.52%
Italy 0.33%
TABLE IV: Top 20 countries with highest percentage of
Let’s Encrypt certificates as a function of total number of
Let’s Encrypt certificates
Figure 3 also indicates that the number of Let’s Encrypt
certificates in smaller or less well connected countries is
blooming and will likely continue into the future. Notable
countries with surprising high rates of use are Ukraine, South
Africa, Argentina and Brazil.
Another interesting question about geographic distribution
is where Let’s Encrypt certificates are disproportionately pop-
ular compared to all website hosting or all certificates. By
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Fig. 4: Relative popularity of Let’s Encrypt certificates
comparing the number of websites in a particular country to
the number of Let’s Encrypt certificates in that country, we can
determine the degree of market penetration of Let’s Encrypt
certificates. For each country, determine the number of any
type of website and the number of Let’s Encrypt websites
hosted there. We compute the ratio of the number of Let’s
Encrypt sites compared to the number of sites in that country,
to indicate the relative popularity of Let’s Encrypt there. For
instance, If one country had 1,000 sites in a sample of 1
million global sites, one would probably expect the number
of Let’s Encrypt certificates in that country to be 1,000 since
they should be representing the same population (all websites).
If, however, had over 5,000 certificates in the same sample
size, one would be surprised about how common Let’s Encrypt
certificates had been deployed. This would be a positive sign
for Let’s Encrypt’s value to people in those countries. If,
alternatively, the country had only a handful of Let’s Encrypt
certificates, then it could raise the question of why are users
there not using Let’s Encrypt as much as one would expect.
This could be due to language barriers on the Let’s Encrypt
site, appealing solutions offered by traditional Certificate Au-
thorities, or poor awareness and marketing of Let’s Encrypt
in those countries. Figure 4 showcases the aforementioned
distribution of Let’s Encrypt certificates worldwide. Notable
countries where Let’s Encrypt is popular are Ukraine, Austria,
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Australia and South Africa.
D. Domain History of using HTTPS
Next, we investigate the HTTPS characteristics of domains
currently using Let’s Encrypt certificates. Specifically, we
examine how many websites have used Let’s Encrypt as their
first Certificate Authority and how many have transitioned
from a traditional Certificate Authority to Let’s Encrypt. To
that end, we leverage one main source of data, Alexa records of
the top 1 million domains. We acknowledge that this is a small
subset of all domains however, given that many Certificate
Authorities did not comply with Certificate Transparency
until very recently, the number of domains for which we
could extrapolate information was extremely limited. On the
contrary, Alexa historic records contain information about the
certificate chains of the most popular domains and therefore
they constitute a more credible source of data, even if the
sample of domains is smaller.
For every domain with Let’s Encrypt certificate, we set
out to identify the first date of issuance of the Let’s Encrypt
certificate and then compare with previous records. Specif-
ically we: (1) collect a list of all domains with certificates
issued by Let’s Encrypt; (2) Find the earliest Let’s Encrypt
certificate issuance day for each of the domains, which can be
found in the Certificate Transparency Log; and (3) Search the
Certificate Transparency Logs for the aforementioned domains
looking for certificates issued before Let’s Encrypt certificates
were adopted.
We observe that in total, 503 domains transitioned from
known CAs to Let’s Encrypt. Table V shows the top 5
Certificate Authorities that clients left for Let’s Encrypt. An in-
teresting insight is that most of the CAs that users ‘abandoned’
according to Alexa in order to transition to Let’s Encrypt, (not
limited to CAs mentioned in the tables above) are CAs that
have one or more of the following characteristics: (1) Have
received poor reviews from users in SSL reviews websites
such as sslshopper [27] and spiceworks [26]; (2) Are
among the Certificate Authorities that provide ‘affordable’
certificates [30]; (3) Are not (or no longer) trusted by popular
browsers; or (4) Have been involved in security breaches [9].
This suggests that Let’s Encrypt has become an attractive
alternative for users who value the trust and privacy provided
by HTTPS but they are currently using untrusted CAs or
are reluctant to pay large amounts of money in order to
obtain a certificate from one of the more expensive Certificate
Authorities.
CA % Transitioned to LE
COMODO RSA CA 31.21%
StartCom CA 12.3%
RapidSSL SHA256 CA 9.7%
Go Daddy 7.4%
GlobalSign SHA256 CA 2.7%
TABLE V: Certificate Authorities popular domains left to
transition to Let’s Encrypt
E. Adoption by popular domains
For this analysis, we focus only on domains listed on Alexa
top 1 million domains and our goal is to investigate how
popular Let’s Encrypt is among them. Figure 5 shows how
many Let’s Encrypt websites are in Alexa’s top 1M list of
websites. We observe that even though there is a slight increase
in the total number of high profile websites that use Let’s
Encrypt, the rate of acquisition is lower compared to the
overall rate of acquisition of Let’s Encrypt as a CA. Clustering
those domains in groups based on their ranking in May showed
that 0.4% are in positions between 1000 and 10,000. 7.7% are
in positions between 10,001 and 100,000 and finally 92% of
these domains rank below 100,000. The low rate of acquisition
can be attributed to the fact that, a website with high visibility
on the web is most likely already certified by a CA; until
its current certificate expires, its administrators would not be
particularly motivated to switch from their current CA to Let’s
8
Encrypt.
      4000
      5000
      6000
      7000
      8000
      9000
     10000
December
January
February
March April MayLE
 D
om
ai
ns
 in
 A
le
xa
 to
p 
1M
Month
Fig. 5: Number of Let’s Encrypt certified domains in Alexa
top 1M
F. Summary of key observations
To summarize, the key observations on the acquisition are
:
1) 7% of all Let’s Encrypt certificates are requested by
companies providing their clients with appliances like
like routers, modems, NAS or dynamic DNS servers.
Companies like Synology, Free and DuckDNS take ad-
vantage of the free automated Let’s Encrypt certificates
and acquire them in bulk in order to guarantee a secure
channel between the client and the web interface of the
client-owned device.
2) More than 55% of all Let’s Encrypt certificates have
been issued in Western Europe. Countries like Switzer-
land, France and the Netherlands have an average of 3.9
certificates per 1000 Internet users. Furthermore, Let’s
Encrypt has democratized the procedure of obtaining
TLS certificates worldwide and therefore in countries
like Argentina or Ukraine Let’s Encrypt certificates are
over-represented in the population of HTTPS websites
by a factor of 5.
3) Anecdotal evidence from Certificate Transparency logs
suggests that Let’s Encrypt has become an attractive
alternative for users who value the trust and privacy
provided by HTTPS but are using either untrusted CAs
or are reluctant to pay large amounts of money in order
to obtain certificates from one of the more expensive
Certificate Authorities.
V. ANALYSIS OF USAGE CHARACTERISTICS
In this section, we explore how domain owners are using
certificates issued by Let’s Encrypt “in the wild”. We estimate
the percentage of domains that have obtained multiple, redun-
dant Let’s Encrypt certificates as well as the percentage of
domains that obtained but never renewed their Let’s Encrypt
certificates. We then run active tests in order to inspect how
many domains actually use their Let’s Encrypt certificates dur-
ing the HTTPS handshake. Additionally, in an effort to detect
malice in domains certified by Let’s Encrypt, we leverage the
VirusTotal service. Finally, investigate cases of typosquatting
domains that are trying to exploit end-users’ trust to HTTPS
certified domains.
A. Active usage analysis
While Let’s Encrypt’s commitment to certificate trans-
parency [20] provides an unprecedented and valuable view into
the TLS ecosystem, it can only serve as an upper bound for
expectations. The mere issuance of a signed certificate implies
nothing about the certificate’s deployment or utilization over
time. One data source that provides useful information about
real world deployment is the Censys.io search engine which is
powered by regular Internet-wide scans [40]. Censys not only
performed full IPV4 scans but also conducts service discovery
and follow on protocol handshakes to collect amplifying
information which can be used to validate the live deployment
of issued certificates.
To this end, we leveraged Censys in order to figure out
the gap between issuance of Let’s Encypt certificates and
their actual deployment. The resulting discrepancy between
these two values, encouraged us to investigate the case of end
users/early adopters that deploy Let’s Encrypt certificates out
of curiosity. We measure cases of duplicate certificates issued,
and we also measure the percentage of certificates that were
issued and never renewed. This information comes exclusively
from Certificate Transparency Logs and Alexa records. As a
final step, we perform our own active testing on the domains
that claim to be using a certificate issued by Let’s Encrypt in
order to actually verify our results.
Our results, shown in Figure 6, show that the highest
observed total number of certificates does not exceed 253,892
on May 3rd 2016. This is an order of magnitude lower than
the naive upper bound discerned from Certificate Transparency
logs of 2,799,771 and the more realistic bound of 1,932,242
unexpired certificates as reported by Let’s Encrypt.
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Fig. 6: Let’s Encrypt certificates observed by Censys
Now, some of these may reflect potential gaps in Cen-
sys scans. To this end, we also conducted our own active
HTTPS scanning. By actually attempting to resolve a domain
from the Certificate Transparency Logs and making an active
HTTPS request we can safely assert which certificates are
active. This addresses the overcounting problem of Certificate
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Transparency logs and potential undercounting by Censys. We
collected all the unique names from the transparency logs and
then ran the sslyze [28] tool, a full featured SSL scanner
written in Python, against each of them.1
The results of this test are summarized in Figures 7—11.
We observe that 90.2% of our domains successfully completed
a HTTPS handshake, whereas 9.8% failed. If we take a closer
look at the reasons behind the failures we will observe that
16.8% of them can be attributed to DNS failures whereas
the majority of failures is due to timeout errors, rejected or
incomplete handshakes.2
The most interesting observation however is that of the
active domains owing a certificate by Let’s Encrypt, only 54%
are using that certificate during the TLS handshake. We delved
deeper in order to inspect what domains were serving different
certificates and what Certificate Authority those certificates
were issued from. Table VI shows the results for the top 20
eTLDs that had acquired but were not using Let’s Encrypt
certificates.
Fig. 7: Proportion of sites that successfully initiated
HTTPS connections
Fig. 8: Reasons for failed HTTPS connections
1One caveat is that sslyze does not take into account SAN domains [25]
and only attempts to connect to port 443.
2The reason behind the high number of timeouts is that SSLyzer only
attempts connections to port 443 and does not follow URL redirects. That
adds some inaccuracy to the results because as we observed, when we tried
to access freeboxos domains, they generated a 302 HTTPS redirect message
and thus we categorized them as failures.
Fig. 9: Proportion of sites with active Let’s Encrypt
certificates as a proportion of all sites that own a Let’s
Encrypt certificate
eTLD CA #domains
ovh.net AlphaSSL-SHA256 359757
ovh.net AlphaSSL 307565
cloudflaressl.com COMODO ECC 49932
elbiahosting.sk *elbiahosting.sk 8549
hosting-admin.net ssl.hosting-admin.net 4503
synology.com Synology Inc. 1354
dreamhost.com sni.dremhost.com 1287
kasserver.com COMODO RSA 797
planroomcheckout.com COMODO RSA 711
pagekite.me StartCom Class 2 406
TABLE VI: top 10 eTLDs and number of domains owning
Let’s Encrypt Certificates but not serving them
Interestingly, we find that most of these are hosting services
which were acquiring a large number of certificates figures
prominently in this list. The most interesting example is again
the one of ovh, a France based cloud and web hosting
provider, also a platinum sponsor of Let’s Encrypt [15]. ovh
promises to provide standard encryption for his services and
to use Let’s Encrypt to that end. The fact that they are using
AlphaSSL shows that either they have misconfigured their
deployment (a rather probable result after manual inspection
of selected ovh hosted websites) or they are still in the process
of transitioning from AlphaSSL to Let’s Encrypt. Another
interesting observation is that many of them were using self-
signed certificates; e.g., elbiahosting returns self-signed
certificates even though on their website they claim that they
have started supporting Let’s Encrypt certificates. At this time,
we cannot speculate on their motives for not using the acquired
Let’s Encrypt certificates despite their publicly stated intent to
do so.
B. Miscellaneous Characteristics of User Behavior
Next, we shed light on three categories of anecdotal but
non-trivial characteristics of user behavior that we observed
during our analysis.
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Redundant certificates: To originally explain the discrepancy
between the Censys results and the number of certificates,
we posited that many domains might be issuing redundant
certificates. This led us to examine the amount of redundancy.
The results showed that on average, 9% of the exact domains
in the Transparency Log had issued more than one certificate
at the same day, with that percentage reaching around 30%
during the months of December 2015 and January 2016 when
Let’s Encrypt was still at its first days as a stable product.
This shows that to some extent the free nature of Let’s Encrypt
certificates triggers the curiosity of users who experiment with
the platform and issue more certificates than they need. Even
though this has no implications to the actual website as it is up
to the webmaster to choose which certificate will be served,
a potential implication of that is the unnecessary bloating of
Certificate Transparency Logs that now have to keep track of
unused certificates.
Non renewal of certificates: To explore further the ‘curiosity’
of end users and their willingness to adopt certificates issued
by Let’s Encrypt we also calculated the number of certificates
that were issued but never renewed (even though Let’s Encrypt
has a policy for automatic certificate renewal every 90 days).
We observed that around 15% of all issued certificates were
never renewed. We believe that this number describes potential
adopters who were willing to experiment with Let’s Encrypt
but decided not to continue using its services.
Toy/fake CA: A low-scale but still interesting observation
about potential misconfiguration of Let’s Encrypt certificates
came from a search in the list of Certificate Authorities that
popular domains had obtain Certificates from. One of the
CAs that appeared in that list was Happy Hacker Fake
CA. We investigated that CA further and discovered that it is
managed by the staging server of Let’s Encrypt. This means
that some end users during their experimentation with Let’s
Encrypt successfully managed to obtain a certificate, only to
realize later (if at all) that this certificate was issued by a
fake CA. Even though browsers would mark this certificate as
untrusted, we believe that for an inexperienced user it would
take time until he realized that his website was insecure and
untrusted despite his belief about the opposite.
C. Potential use for Malice
Traditionally end users have been ‘trained’ to trust a website
if it has the verified certificate symbol against its domain
name. However, now with the existence of Let’s Encrypt, an
adversary can easily obtain a valid certificate for a malicious or
typosquatting domain making an end user fall prey to phishing
and drive by download category of attacks.
1) Hosting malware
We make use of the VirusTotal API to detect malicious
activity on Let’s Encrypt-signed websites. The VirusTotal API
provides a detection ratio depending on how many of these
services classified a particular domain as malicious. We were
able toobtain a private API key to conduct this measurement
and made use of the URL report API to scan a sample of
100,000 domains from the unique domains in our Certificate
Transparency database. The reason why we only chose a small
(but random) sample of domains was our limited quotas on
VirusTotal along with the high latency of executing URL
scans. Virus Total allowed us to inspect domain names using
67 different antivirus solutions and reported how many out of
the 67 solutions classify the website as malicious.
An interesting first result of our VirusTotal measurements
is that 82,524 of the 100,000 sampled domains were scanned
for the very first time. This implies that end users, web
administrators and even certificate transparency monitors fail
to run safety checks on websites to ensure protection from
malicious actors. A second scan was therefore conducted to
gather the results for all the domains that were scanned for
the first time.
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Fig. 10: Number of websites with Let’s Encrypt certificates
that triggered one or more antivirus alerts through Virus
Total
Figure 10 shows that around 1% of the websites inspected
were found to be malicious by one or more antivirus solutions.
Although the total number of domains identified is a very
small component of the total number of domains scanned
(and of the broader HTTPS ecosystem), we believe that this
finding constitutes an indication that malicious adversaries
have started to take the ease of issuing TLS certificates as
an opportunity to exploit end users’ notion of trust.
2) Typosquatting
As a next step we focused on domains that were most
likely being typosquatting [42], [32]. To determine which of
the Let’s Encrypt sites are likely typosquatting, we leveraged
a technique based on the Levenshtein distance[24], which
measures how similar two strings of characters are, where the
measure is defined in terms of an ‘edit distance’. Edit distance
describes the number of modifications to one string that you
need to get the other. By using this technique in a generative
fashion, we can create sets of domain names that are a low
edit distance away from popular brand names. We searched
for domains with close matches (strings with an edit distance
of maximum one).
Specifically, we take the Alexa top 250 domain names. We
remove those that are less than 6 characters or too common
(for example ‘apple’ as the word is too common). Then,
we ran a Levenshtein distance generator with a maximum
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edit distance of one and removed anything that ended up as
a real word (e.g. flickr -> flicker). Thus, we determined a
list of domain name misspellings that are similar to other
common domains. Then, performed a lookup of this large list
of possible misspellings to determine which of them actually
appear in the set of Let’s Encrypt signed certificates. We
ignored changes in the told level domain. We were careful
to remove sites that were obviously not typosquatting, in case
they were included in the list due to spelling similarities.
Fig. 11: Top sites targeted by typosquatting within Let’s
Encrypt Certificate population
Out of the 105 eligible popular domain names sampled,
we discovered 203 likely typosquatting domain matches (e.g.
domain within an edit distance of one from the original). We
also had to be careful to remove sites that were obviously
not typosquatted, in case they were included in the list due to
spelling similarities. A sample of the most commonly targeted
domains are shown in Table VII along with example URLs.
Domain Name Number matches Example Domain
Google 14 googlez.fr
Facebook 12 faecbook.fr
Reddit 12 redditq.com
Blogger 8 blogges.de
Forbes 7 dorbes.com
Allegro 7 alleguo.com
Netflix 6 netflix.desi
Booking 6 bookhing.com
TABLE VII: Sample of top typosquatted target and
example typosquatting domains
D. Observations
To summarize, the key observations are :
1) We investigated the actual usage patterns of Let’s En-
crypt certificates in order to assess how users interact
with the service. We observed that on average 9% of
Let’s Encrypt domains have obtained multiple, redun-
dant certificates and 15% of all the certificates obtained
have not been renewed.
2) We ran active HTTPS tests to evaluate how many of
the domains with an unexpired certificate are actually
serving their clients with that certificate. Surprisingly
enough, only 54% of the active domains use their Let’s
Encrypt certificate whereas 46% use either self-signed
certificates or certificates issued by other CAs.
3) To detect malice in the domains we leveraged the
VirusTotal service which examines each domain against
67 antivirus solutions and found that 1% of the domains,
tested positive for some threat.
4) Further analysis showed that malicious actors are at-
tempting to exploit end users’ trust by using certificates
issued by Let’s Encrypt for domains that are either
typosquatting.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we discuss the potential implications of our
observations for different players in the HTTPS ecosystem:
Let’s Encrypt, web domains, and end-users and browsers.
Let’s Encrypt: We identify a few key opportunities for
Let’s Encrypt to improve adoption and also improve overall
efficiency and scalability. Specifically,
• Revisit the need for wildcards: With more and more
companies issuing individual Let’s Encrypt certificates
for their clients, and with more and more users issuing
multiple certificates out of curiosity or need, Let’s En-
crypt should consider the option of allowing its users to
choose whether they want to issue wildcard certificates
or not. It could potentially enforce quotas for individual
domains. The benefit of these actions is clear: Certificate
Transparency logs will remain manageable in size as with
the current trends, adding around a million certificates on
a monthly basis can potentially lead to scalability issues
for these logs and performance issues for monitors that
want to inspect them or a regular basis.
• Check intent before issuing certificates: Being free and
automated lowers the barrier not only for less popular
websites but also for abusive purposes. We already see
early evidence of the use of Let’s Encrypt for malware-
laden websites and typosquatting. One option is that
Let’s Encrypt can use well-known tools and approaches
from the security community to check if the website has
potentially abusive intent before issuing a new certificate;
e.g., look at the Google SafeBrowsing history of the site
or initiate an active scan on a new certificate request.
While this does not offer perfect protection against users
(e.g., a newly created domain can be dormat and turn
malicious later), this does raise the bar for websites that
are already known to exhibit malicious intents.
For Users and Client Browsers: In terms of users and user-
facing browsers, we identify two key implications:
• Protect the User through Website Analysis The increasing
adoption of HTTPS definitely leads to a safer and more
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trusted browsing environment for users who share more
and more of their private data online. However, the ease
of deployment of Let’s Encrypt certificates has shown that
it becomes easier for an attacker to exploit that notion
of trust in order to deploy ‘trusted’ malicious domains.
Specifically, Let’s Encrypt as it is lacks supervision in
the domains that it signs; it can contribute to the creation
of seemingly secure malware-hosting and typosquatted
domains. For instance, given that we observe many
popular websites are not using Let’s Encrypt, it might
be easy to distinguish typosquatting behaviors against
popular domains by simply looking at the certificates.
• Proactively check for configuration errors: Our obser-
vations suggest that there are serious misconfigurations
among many website owners who use Let’s Encrypt.
Additional documentation, training materials, and native
language support could educate these users on proper
deployments. Additionally, scanning sites for misconfig-
urations and alerting the user could provide valuable
encouragement for site owners to improve. From the users
side, additional transparency about deployment quality
can allow users and browsers to proactively check for
dangerous connections when accessing newly HTTPS-
enabled sites.
• Use active measurements to complement Certificate
Transparency: We observe that nearly half of all issued
certificates are never used, including by domains that are
purportedly sponsors of the the Let’s Encrypt effort. This
suggest that looking at the transparency log by itself may
not be a sufficient proof of the “active” status of a certifi-
cate and thus we will still need some active measurement
system [34], [49] to complement transparency logs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of Let’s Encrypt and Certificate Trans-
parency are promising and potentially revolutionary trends
in the HTTPS ecosystem. To fully unleash the potential of
these opportunities, however, we need to have a systematic
understanding of how users are acquiring and actually using
these capabilities. This measurement study is a first look at
the adoption characteristics of this emerging ecosystem.
In particular, we find that Let’s Encrypt is being acquired
more by less-popular domains and in countries with tradition-
ally lower Internet penetration, which suggests the potential
to democratize the benefits of HTTPS. At the same time,
however, we do observe a certain degree of “lack of seri-
ousness” in adoption; many certificates are inactive and there
are obvious sources of misconfigurations and inefficiencies
in how deployed certificates are being used. Finally, we also
make a cautionary note that ease of acquisition and low cost
is a double-edged sword. As it improves accessibility, it also
lowers the barriers for malicious uses. We see early evidence
of potential sources of abuse of Let’s Encrypt by malicious
websites hosting malware and/or typosquatting.
We discussed key implications for different players in
this ecosystem and how they can use these findings to take
actionable measures. For instance, Let’s Encrypt could offer
new capabilities to offer wildcard certificates to reduce load.
There may also be a need to check for abusive intent through
a community-run warning system. Finally, browser vendors
and users can take easy precautions to detect misconfigured
deployments to avoid privacy violations.
As with any study looking at an emerging phenomenon, our
datasets invariably have some limitations and biases. Despite
these, we believe that our analysis has shed light on some key
observations on the adoption. These have important implica-
tions that can inform the future of these technologies. We hope
that our analysis and results inspire future measurements and
can translate into action items for various parties involved.
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